Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
2 As special operations forces continue to fight the global war on terror, reaching more and more into denied areas and politically sensitive areas, covert, clandestine, and low-visibility operations will become critical tools. 3 During World War II, the newly-formed Office of Strategic Services (OSS) deployed 93 three-man "Jedburgh" teams into enemy-occupied France on secret missions. These teams, consisting of two officers and one enlisted radio operator, parachuted into enemy territory to link up with the partisan fighters of the French
Resistance to conduct classic unconventional warfare against the German forces, to include sabotage and hit-and-run attacks. 4 Presidential finding and Congressional notification. 6 Other critics echo that claim and accuse the Bush administration of bypassing the legal requirements on covert action by using special operations forces rather than the CIA. 7 This paper will examine the statutory and doctrinal definitions of covert action, to include the "traditional military activities" exception to the law; the legal requirements for using covert action as defined in law; and the policy issues surrounding the use of covert action. As will be seen, special operations forces conducting missions where the role of the U.S. is unacknowledged are not conducting "covert action" within the meaning of the law, as long as those missions are under the command and control of a military commander in support of ongoing or anticipated hostilities ("Title 10 operations"). These operations would not rise to the statutory level of "covert action"
and thus would not require the Presidential finding and Congressional notification;
however, due to underlying policy concerns, similar approval and notification is recommended.
Defining "Covert Action"
Under federal law, "covert action" is defined as "an activity or activities of the Covert action is sometimes referred to as the "third option" of American policy, allowing the government to influence other nations, whether friendly or enemy, in areas of national interest, without overtly revealing its hand or resorting to military action. 14 The "plausible deniability" inherent in covert action allows the United States to pursue national interests in areas otherwise denied to a U.S. presence. Additionally, the use of covert action may allow the U.S. to influence a peer or near-peer competitor without the risk of escalation or military conflict. This was particularly important during the Cold War, as both the United States and the Soviet Union used covert action to avoid a larger conventional war between the two super-powers. 15 Finally, although secret by definition, federal law requires Presidential approval and significant executive and legislative oversight (by members of both political parties) of covert action, which reduces the risk of "rogue" programs. 16 The first statutory definition of "covert action" was enacted in 1991 in an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947. Federal law defines covert action as "an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly…." 17 The law also excludes the following categories from the statutory definition of covert:
(1) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of United States Government programs, or administrative activities;
(2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities; (3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted by United States Government law enforcement agencies or routine support to such activities; or (4) activities to provide routine support to the overt activities (other than activities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3)) of other United States Government agencies abroad. 18 The critical exception to the definition of "covert action" for the special operations community is the "traditional military activities" exception, which will be covered in detail below.
Adding to the confusion, Executive Order 12333, which pre-dates the 1991 amendment to the National Security Act, uses the phrase "special activities" to describe covert action. 19 The executive order defines "special activities" as:
…activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities, but which are not intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions.
20
There are some key distinctions between the statutory definition of "covert action"
and the executive order definition of "special activities." Whereas the scope of covert actions are limited to those seeking "to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad," the scope of special activities is much broader, including all activities "in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad." The distinction is subtle, but nevertheless important. More importantly, the executive order definition of special activities does not have an exception for traditional military activities, a critical exception for special operations which will be examined in more detail later in this paper.
By its own terms, however, the executive order only applies to the intelligence community and intelligence activities. 21 This would not include special operations forces on an operational mission under the command of a military commander. The DoD elements of the Intelligence Community (IC) only include the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the "offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs," and "the intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps." 22 The National Security Act definition of the IC is similar with respect to DoD. 23 Notably, neither definition presumes that special operations units, conducting special operations missions, would fall within the definition of the intelligence community.
The Exception That Swallows the Rule: "Traditional Military Activities" Determining whether an unacknowledged special operations mission meets the statutory definition of "covert action" is critical, because if it does, it must be preceded by a Presidential finding and Congressional notification. The National Security Act requires the president to make a finding in order to determine that the action "is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security of the United States…." 33 The Act requires that the President make the finding in writing in advance unless time does not permit; in that case, a written record of the oral finding must be made and reduced to a finding within 48 hours. The finding must specify all federal agencies participating in the action, as well as any third parties involved, and the finding cannot violate a US law or the Constitution. The statue identifies the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as the lead for covert action. Finally, the 1991 amendments specified that the President must keep the congressional intelligence committees informed, or, in extraordinary circumstances, certain limited members of those committees. 34 
Policy Issues with Covert Operations
Covert action raises a number of important policy issues. First, many question the legitimacy of covert action. Some critics argue that covert action violates the principles of international law and the United Nations charter, as it involves "meddling"
in the affairs of another sovereign nation-state without a legitimate mandate or resolution to do so. 35 In addition, covert action may be considered an act of war by the target nation. 36 There is some concern that the secrecy of covert action creates a lack of accountability and transparency, despite the oversight requirements. Covert propaganda raises the specter of "blowback," which refers to the risk of a story planted in foreign media that then gets picked up by the U.S. media and reported in American media. Finally, particularly with larger paramilitary operations, there is a risk of discovery and public disclosure, which may have adverse consequences for the U.S.
administration. 37 Public disclosure of a covert action could embarrass the U.S.
government, as well as the government of the target country, and could effectively limit or even reverse the foreign policy gains sought from the covert action in the first place.
Beyond those policy concerns, the use of special operations forces in secret, denied operations, whether or not they rise to the statutory level of "covert action," raises additional concerns. First, because the special operations forces would undoubtedly be out of uniform and posing as civilians, they might lose the international protections they enjoy under the Geneva Conventions. One commentator noted that even though the individual operators on the mission might be volunteers, their discovery or capture might presumably endanger other soldiers' protections worldwide or adversely affect morale. 38 Unacknowledged special operations, while still raising the same policy concerns as CIA covert action, would arguably be subject to much less oversight and review, since the operation would not have the Presidential finding and Congressional oversight. Such operations could conceivably be planned and approved wholly within DoD, lacking transparency and accountability. In joint doctrine, a covert operation is defined as:
an operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. A covert operation differs from a clandestine operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the identity of the sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation. 41 This definition focuses solely on concealment of the sponsor, and does not address the strategic level foreign policy element of the statutory definition ("to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad") or include the critical "traditional military activities" exception found in the statue. It is conceivable that an unacknowledged special operation could be considered "covert" under the DoD definition yet not rise to the threshold of the statutory definition of covert action. This is a critical distinction, because any operation deemed to be covert action under the statute will require Presidential findings and notice to Congress.
Joint doctrine contrasts covert operations with "clandestine operations," which are defined in joint doctrine as:
an operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. 42 Adding to the confusion, joint doctrine adds a third category called "low visibility operations:"
Sensitive operations wherein the political-military restrictions inherent in covert and clandestine operations are either not necessary or not feasible; actions are taken as required to limit exposure of those involved and/or their activities. Execution of these operations is undertaken with the knowledge that the action and/or sponsorship of the operation may preclude plausible denial by the initiating power. 43 Other than this definition, found in the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms, the term "low visibility operations" is not further explained or defined in the joint publication on special operations. The term "low visibility operations" does appear in the new DoD policy on irregular warfare, discussed below.
Frankly, these doctrinal distinctions are somewhat unclear. If "covert" means the sponsor is secret, while "clandestine" means the operation itself is secret, does this distinction include the results of the operation? For example, if a special operations team successfully conducts a secret operation to sabotage a bridge, making it collapse in a way that appears to be accidental structural failure, is this a clandestine operation?
The operation is secret, but the results are clearly not-the locals would know the bridge was damaged. On the other hand, is it covert just because the special operations team was successful enough to remain undetected throughout? The difficulty with the DoD definitions is that, if an operation remains completely secret (i.e., is successful), then the sponsor almost certainly remains secret as well, unless the U.S.
intends to later acknowledge the operation.
Adding to the uncertainty, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, General James R. Clapper, Jr., addressed this issue in his written answers to the Senate Armed Services Committee's advance policy questions before his confirmation hearing. When asked whether military counterterrorism activities constituted covert actions within the meaning of the law, he responded in the negative, but added this:
Clandestine activities-a term that is not statutorily defined--are those activities conducted in secret, but which are, in an intelligence context, passive in nature. For me, the crucial distinction lies in whether an activity is "passive" (which is the case with intelligence activities) or "active" (which is the case with covert action). It is my understanding that military forces are not conducting "covert action." A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. 46 In order to be successful in irregular warfare, DoD intends to "extend U.S. reach into denied areas and uncertain environments by operating with and through indigenous foreign forces." 47 Such warfare is a separate mission from training and advising a country's own military forces in order for that country to protect its own sovereignty.
Operating through indigenous forces to extend U.S. reach essentially involves the use of surrogate or paramilitary forces to achieve U.S. national interests in areas where U.S. Paramilitary operations are a critical tool in the war on terrorism, and the role of special operations forces will continue to grow in this area. It is likely that as it does, USSOCOM will find it necessary to deny the role of U.S. forces in sensitive or denied areas, particularly in the case of UW. In those cases, as long as the special operations forces remain under a military commander, these paramilitary operations will not be "covert" within the legal meaning of the phrase.
Recommendations
Success in irregular warfare requires the capability for special operations forces to conduct secret and unacknowledged operations in countries where hostilities are ongoing or anticipated. In order to clarify some of the underlying authorities, and address the policy concerns with covert and clandestine operations, DoD should consider the following recommendations:
1. Revise the joint doctrinal definition of "covert operations" to make it consistent with the statutory definition, as follows:
A covert operation is an operation under the command and control of an intelligence agency, to include DoD intelligence agencies, to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly. Covert operations are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. Operations under the command and control of a military commander, in support of ongoing or anticipated hostilities, are not covert operations even though the role of the United States will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.
2. Re-define "clandestine operations" in joint doctrine as follows to encompass all secret military operations:
Within DoD, a clandestine operation is a special operations mission conducted under the command and control of a military commander, in support of ongoing or anticipated hostilities, in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment of the operation itself. The role of the United States may or may not be acknowledged in clandestine military operations.
3. In order to increase accountability, require Presidential approval for all clandestine special operations conducted in countries where hostilities are anticipated (rather than ongoing hostilities), a military commander will be in command, and it is intended that the role of the United States will be unacknowledged. If special operations forces participate in a true covert action (i.e., not a traditional military activities but under the control and direction of an intelligence agency), then the statutory requirements for a finding and Congressional notification would apply. 
Conclusion
The ability for the United States to employ special operations forces in denied areas, on secret, unacknowledged missions, is critical to our success in the current war and in future conflict. Covert and clandestine special operations are an important tool for the President to employ in safeguarding our national interests when neither overt military force nor soft power is feasible. Unless and until Congress modifies the law, unacknowledged special operations under the command of a military commander
